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TAXATION-FEDERAL TAX LIENS-SECTION 6321 OF THE INTERNAL 
REVENUE CODE AS BASIS FOR INJUNCTION BINDING ASSETS OF FOREIGN 
BRANCH OF AMERICAN BANK-The Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
issued jeopardy assessments against the taxpayer, Omar, S.A., a Uruguayan 
corporation. To avoid payment, Omar began to liquidate its American-held 
assets by transferring receipts out of the country. Pursuant to its statutory 
right, under section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,1 to impose 
a lien upon all property of a delinquent taxpayer, the United States brought 
suit against Omar and various New York banks in the domestic and 
foreign branches of which Omar's funds were deposited. The district court 
granted a preliminary injunction2 restraining certain of the banks from 
transferring any property whether located in the United States or held 
by the banks for Omar in foreign branches. On appeal, held, injunction 
modified so as not to include property held by the foreign branches of 
the appealing American bank. Since a foreign branch bank is a separate 
entity from the parent bank, jurisdiction over the parent does not constitute 
jurisdiction over funds deposited in the branch. United States v. First Nat'l 
City Bank, 321 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1963). 
The effect of section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is 
to create a statutory attachment or garnishment without requiring court 
processes necessary in ordinary garnishment proceedings.3 Where for 
some reason personal jurisdiction over the delinquent taxpayer is unobtain-
able, the Government is able to proceed in actions quasi in rem to enforce 
its lien on specific property4 belonging to the taxpayer within the jurisdic-
1 !NT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 6321, provides: "If any person liable to pay any tax 
neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, 
additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that 
may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all 
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person." 
See also INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6322, 6331, 6332. 
2 The injunction issued pursuant to !NT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § '7402(a), which grants 
jurisdiction to district courts "to make and issue in civil actions, writs and orders of 
injunction, and of ne exeat republica, orders appointing receivers, and such other orders 
and processes, and to render such judgments and decrees as may be necessary or 
appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws." See also INT. REv. CODE OF 
1954, § '7403. 
a See, e.g., United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1955), where the court held 
that "the effect of the federal taxing statutes •.. is to create a statutory attachment and 
garnishment.in which the service of notice provided by statute takes the place of the court 
process in the ordinary garnishment proceeding." Id. at 121. 
4 "Property" is here construed to include rights to property. 
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tion of the court.5 In the principal case the court did not have in personam 
jurisdiction of Omar. Therefore, the crucial question was whether in 
personam jurisdiction of Omar's debtor, First National, conferred quasi in 
rem jurisdiction of Omar's funds. The Government argued that section 6321 
has a global effect and therefore in personam jurisdiction of the bank's home 
office in New York was enough to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction of 
Omar's extraterritorial funds, since the home office could control the 
foreign branch. The majority of the court assumed that if it had no juris-
diction of Omar's funds outside the United States any injunction issued 
pursuant to the suit which purported to bind foreign-held assets was 
improper.6 As a result, the majority examined the law of garnishment pro-
ceedings to determine whether the bank's debt to Omar was within the 
jurisdiction of the district court.7 The nature of garnishment is such that 
the garnisher obtains no greater right against the garnishee than the 
garnishee's creditor has.8 Thus, only if Omar could sue First National in 
New York to recover its deposits would the court have jurisdiction over 
the funds in the foreign branch. Omar's right to sue in New York depended 
on its right against First National arising out of a deposit made in the 
latter's branch. The nature of Omar's right to sue was to be determined 
by New York state law, for the federal tax lien statute creates no property 
rights, but merely attaches consequences to rights created under state 
law.9 In holding against the Government the court relied on a line of New 
York cases which indicate that accounts in a foreign branch bank are not 
subject to attachment or execution by the process of a New York court 
served in New York on a main office, branch, or agency of the bank.10 This 
II United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 
(1957). 
a In the principal case Judge Hays dissented on the ground that the only issue involved 
was the propriety of the district court's order. Since the court had in personam jurisdiction 
over appellant it could order appellant to freeze Omar's funds. Judge Hays felt that the 
entire issue dealing with whether the Government's lien attached was to be left for 
the pending action against Omar; since the appeal was from the district court's order, 
the propriety of the order, not the attachment of the lien, was the only issue. Principal 
case at 325 (dissenting opinion). 
7 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), where the Court said that a state 
has no right "to enter a judgment purporting to extinguish the interest of such a person 
[over whom it has no personal jurisdiction] in property over which the court has no 
jurisdiction." Id. at 250. For the original statement of this doctrine, see Pennoyer v. 
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). 
8 E.g., if the garnishee and garnishee's creditor have a contract based upon a con-
tingency, the gamisher cannot successfully sue the garnishee until the contingency 
has occurred because the garnishee's creditor cannot collect until then. Kama-Smith Co. v. 
Maloney, 112 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1940). 
9 See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960) (government tax lien could not 
attach to insurance policy unless taxpayer had property rights in the policy as defined 
by state law); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958) (taxpayer's property rights under 
a contract to be determined by state law); Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 
1952) (government lien upon taxpayer's bank account limited by taxpayer's state-defined 
rights in the account). 
10 See Comment, 56 MICH. L. REv. 90 (1957). 
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line of cases follows the so-called "separate entity" theory, which holds that 
branches of a bank are to be treated as separate legal entities. 
In general, the main office and branches are regarded as one legal entity. 
The branch bank is considered the agent of the parent bank, with the 
parent ultimately liable for debts of the branch.11 Consideration of the 
main office and branches as one entity is based on obvious policy factors. 
The board of directors, located at the situs of the main office, has control 
over the various branches.12 The bank, including its foreign and domestic 
branches, is taxable as a single corporate entity.18 Moreover, federal law 
maintains the character of the banking operations as a single entity by 
requiring banks to operate abroad by means of branches rather than foreign 
subsidiary corporations.14 Yet, despite these reasons for regarding the entire 
banking operation as a single entity, in certain situations generally char-
acterized as "arm's-length relationships" foreign branch banks are deemed 
separate entities from the domestic parent.15 Branches or agencies have been 
held to be independent entities in four major respects: deposits are payable 
to the depositor only at the branch where deposited;16 checks made out 
to third parties need be honored only when drawn on the branch which is 
the situs of the deposit;17 a subpoena duces tecum on a foreign branch 
bank's records is void;18 and a foreign branch is separate with regard to the 
collection of forwarded paper.19 
The important factor in any attempt to harmonize the cases is that a 
foreign branch in each of the above situations has been held a separate entity 
11 See Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 130 Misc. 66, 224 N.Y. Supp. 102 (Sup. Ct. 1927), 
afj'd, 223 App. Div. 754, 227 N.Y. Supp. 907, afj'd, 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928). 
The Sokoloff case was decided prior to § 138 of the N.Y. BANKING LAw, which reads: 
"Any bank ..• which ••. shall have opened and occupied a branch office or branch 
offices in any foreign country shall be liable for contracts to be performed at such 
branch office or offices • . • to no greater extent than a bank • . • organized and 
existing under the laws of such foreign country would be liable under its laws." 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-106, recognizes the separate entity principle in providing 
that "a branch or separate office of a bank [maintaining its own deposit ledgers] is a 
separate bank for the purpose of computing the time within which and determining the 
place at or to which action may be taken or notices or orders shall be given under 
this Article • . . ." 
12 The Board of Directors of First National City Bank is located in New York. 
13 Posades v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497 (1935). 
14 38 Stat. 273 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1958). 
15 For a general discussion of the separate entity doctrine, see Note, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 
333 (1963). 
16 See Murtaugh v. Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., 149 Misc. 693, 269 N.Y. Supp. 
65 (N.Y. City Ct. 1933); Bluebird Undergarment Corp. v. Gomez, 139 Misc. 742, 249 N.Y. 
Supp. 319 (N.Y. City Ct. 1931). 
17 See Chrzanowska v. Com Exch. Bank, 173 App. Div. 285, 159 N.Y.S. 385 (1916), 
afj'd, 225 N.Y. 728, 122 N.E. 877 (1919). 
18 The separate entity theory was used in this respect in In re Harris, 27 F. Supp. 
480 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); that part of Harris which involved the separate entity theory, however, 
was subsequently overruled in First Nat'l City Bank v. Internal Revenue Serv., 271 F.2d 
616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948, rehearing denied, 362 U.S. 906 (1960). 
19 See Pan-American Bank &: Trust Co. v. National City Bank, 6 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 269 U.S. 554 (1925). 
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for a specific purpose. The separate entity doctrine is thus an exception 
to the usual single entity rule and is used when a court deems it necessary 
to insulate one office of a bank from liability incurred by another. It does 
not necessarily follow, therefore, that in every instance a branch is to be 
treated as a separate entity. The principal case is the first case to hold that 
branch banks are to be treated as separate entities so as to limit any global 
effect of section 6321. The court has thus chosen to take a rule having its 
genesis in policy considerations dealing with banking and to apply that 
rule so as to limit the collection of tax revenue. In so limiting the effect of 
the statute the court chose to reject the possibility of extending the doctrine 
of several cases where extraterritorial injunctions have been upheld. 
The issuance of injunctions which have effect beyond the court's 
territorial jurisdiction is not a new concept, even when such effect takes 
place in foreign countries. In antitrust cases courts have gone so far as 
to issue injunctions prohibiting activity in a foreign country.20 Moreover, 
extraterritorial injunctions involving tax liens were upheld specifically in 
two cases cited by the Government in the principal case. In First Nat'l 
City Bank v. Internal Revenue Serv.21 the court upheld a subpoena duces 
tecum which required the bank to order its Panamanian branch to return 
books located in Panama. In that case it was determined that the main 
office definitely had the power to order such compliance by its branch.22 
The court in the principal case, however, limited First Nat'l City Bank v. 
Internal Revenue Serv. to its facts, finding that while extraterritorial actions 
could be sustained to order the production of a branch's books, such extra-
territorial actions could not be sustained to order the branch to freeze a 
creditor's funds. In United States v. Ross23 the court affirmed an injunction 
ordering Ross, the major stockholder and company president, to refrain 
from transferring property of two Bahamian corporations. The court had 
jurisdiction of Ross, but not of either corporation. The court held that 
jurisdiction of the defendant controlling the property is sufficient to order 
him to transfer property regardless of whether that property is within or 
without the court's territorial jurisdiction.24 The crucial distinction between 
Ross and the principal case is that in Ross the court had jurisdiction of the 
delinquent taxpayer, while in the principal case the court had jurisdiction 
20 See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952); Timken Roller Bearing 
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). See also Haight, International Law and Extra-
territorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954); Whitney, Sources of 
Conflict Between International Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 655 (1954); 
Note, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1452 (1956). 
21 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959). 
22 The issue in the principal case was not whether the New York office had the 
controlling power to order its branches to freeze an account; instead, the issue was 
whether defendant was legally obligated to do so. 
23 302 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1962). 
24 See New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); Marshall v. Turnbull, 
32 Fed. 124 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1887); SEC v. Minas De Artemisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 
1945). See also REsTATEMENT, CONFUcr OF LAws §§ 97, 94, comment a (1934). 
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only of the delinquent taxpayer's debtor. Yet the court in the principal case, 
had it so desired, could have extended the Ross doctrine to cover the 
principal case. Both cases involved tax liens established under the Internal 
Revenue Code and not patently based on jurisdiction of the delinquent 
taxpayer. Rather than extend the Ross holding to sustain an extraterritorial 
injunction directed at the delinquent taxpayer's debtor, however, the 
court chose to apply the separate entity doctrine to limit the potential 
impact of Ross. Since the separate entity doctrine is a judicial tool used to 
reach a desired result, the policy considerations against giving section 6321 
a global effect must have controlled the court's decision. In light of these 
considerations, the court's decision would appear convincing. The court 
pointed out the important factors which militate against giving section 6321 
a global effect. The first is the problem of valuing foreign deposits in 
satisfaction of a tax claim stated in dollars. The multiple and fluctuating 
exchange rates of many countries compound this problem.25 Second, 
foreign depositors, realizing that their funds could be frozen if put in 
branch banks having parent offices situated within American jurisdiction, 
would be discouraged from dealing with foreign branches of American 
banks.26 This would tend to impair the competitive position of the American 
branches. The most compelling consideration before the court, however, 
was the potential conflict of laws problem.27 Foreign branch banks are 
licensed under foreign law; the law of the situs governs. As a result, an 
injunction requiring foreign branch banks to freeze funds might subject the 
entire banking operation to double liability: once to the corporation (such 
as Omar) suing in the foreign country, which would probably not respect 
the American injunction; and again to the United States as a penalty for 
violating the injunction. Moreover, the issuance of an injunction as asked 
for by the Government would seem to mean that foreign courts would, 
in turn, be able to issue injunctions against the American branch which 
would affect accounts or activities of the head office in the United States. 
As the court in the principal case said, "The untoward difficulties and 
potential conflict between the laws of different nations that such a doctrine 
would produce militate against giving it support here."28 
It would appear, therefore, that latent considerations form a sounder 
basis for the decision in the principal case than a rubber stamp application 
25 See Richard v. American Union Bank, 253 N.Y. 166, 170 N.E. 532 (1930). A useful 
standard for resolving this problem is UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-212(6), which 
provides a formula for adjustment to foreign currencies in regard to a bank's right 
of charge-back or refund: "If a credit is given in dollars as the equivalent of the value 
of an item payable in a foreign currency the dollar amount of any charge-back or 
refund shall be calculated on the basis of the buying sight rate for the foreign currency 
prevailing on the day when the person entitled to the charge-back or refund learns 
that it will not receive payment in ordinary course." 
26 See principal case at 24. 
27 See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 
281 (1949). 
28 Principal case at 24. 
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of the separate entity doctrine. When the scope of section 6321 is ad-
judicated in future cases, the important question will be whether the 
holding in the principal case will be limited to cases dealing with inter-
national banking or will be extended to cover other uses of the tax lien 
power. Since international banking involves unique considerations, it would 
seem advisable to limit the principal case to its facts, and consider each 
new attempt by the Government to reach foreign-held assets on the basis 
of the particular policies involved. 
Gerald ]. Laba 
